Abstract Wittgenstein's concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different "positive" wittgensteinian accounts-Campbell's idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass' proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist-, and Rhodes' and Gipp's account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively.
Introduction
In this paper, I focus on a recent trend in the philosophy of psychiatry, the idea of employing concepts from the philosophical works of Ludwig Wittgenstein towards an understanding of schizophrenia. Luis Sass was the first author who employed Wittgenstein's notion of solipsism as an aid in the interpretation of the famous schizophrenic patient Daniel Schreber (Sass, 1994 (Sass, , 2004 Schreber, 1903 ). Sass's idea was criticized on exegetical grounds, through the argument that Wittgenstein conceived a solipsistic language as impossible, not as an interpretive tool (Read, 2001 (Read, , 2003 . Then John Campbell (2001) proposed that the new framework propositions that Wittgenstein characterized in On Certainty (Wittgenstein, 1962) 1 could play a role in accounting for schizophrenic delusions, receiving Tim Thornton's objections (2004 Thornton's objections ( , 2008 Eilan (2000) . AU1 E. Lalumera (*) Psychology Department, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy e-mail: elisabetta.lalumera@unimib.it to which our background and framework propositions are what the schizophrenic lacks, or has a disrupted relation with, rather than what the schizophrenic builds anew . What these diverse proposals have in common is the use of philosophical-specifically, Wittgensteinian-concepts to "understand schizophrenia". I use scare quotes here, because the point of my paper is precisely to distinguish the different kinds of understanding of schizophrenia that are apparently proposed by Wittgenstein's philosophical concepts, in these different attempts.
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The issue is relevant for the definition of the relationship between philosophy and psychiatry, and between the different traditions within philosophy of psychiatry, namely, analytic philosophy and phenomenology.Schizophrenia has traditionally been described as impossible to understand due to both the deeply unfamiliar content of delusions that feature among its diagnostically crucial main symptoms, and the non-consequent epistemic and practical behaviour of patients (namely, the fact that often they do not take their own beliefs as premises for reaching further conclusions or making plans). The incomprehensibility claim dates back to Karl Jasper's distinction between primary and secondary delusions, in which the primary ones are characterized as "quite alien modes of experience", "largely incomprehensible, unreal and beyond our understanding" (Jaspers, 1963, vol. 1, 98) . Though the characterization of schizophrenia of the current nosologies is significantly different from Jaspers', the theme of the impossibility of understanding is still associated with this disorder. Thornton (2004) has described wittgensteinian accounts as tentative cases where "philosophical analysis can provide ways of interpreting or making sense of expressions of mental disorder and thus escaping Jaspers' suggestion that 'schizophrenic psychic life' is 'ununderstandable'" (Thornton, 2004, 216) ; and he also argued that they fail. In this paper, I disagree with this reading. One way to put my main question is the following: is the kind of understanding provided by wittgensteinian accounts of schizophrenia the same kind of understanding that Jaspers claimed to be impossible? My answer is negative: wittgensteinian accounts such as Campbell's, Sass', and Rhodes and Gipps' can provide neither static nor genetic empathy with respect to the manifestations of the disorder-but if accurately read, they are not even meant to. I argue, however, that there is in fact some other kind of understanding that such wittgensteinian accounts, assuming that they are exegetically accurate-can provide, namely conceptual clarification.
In order to sustain this claim I shall begin the next section by introducing a distinction between three possible senses of our pre-theoretical notion of understanding: scientific explanation, empathic understanding, and philosophical or conceptual clarification. The first two senses roughly correspond to Jaspers' own distinction, but I shall add the dimension of model construction to the explanation, which is 2 Naomi Eilan also remarked that "it is not easy to get right the kind of understanding that might be brought to bear on such phenomena while at the same time doing justice to Jaspers' warranted sense of the deep and baffling otherness of the schizophrenic's sense of the self and the world (2000, 97)". Her conclusion in the paper is negative-she explains the impossibility of understanding as an impossibility of emotional empathy.
taken from contemporary philosophy of science. Conceptual clarification is typical of classical analytic philosophy. After introducing the distinction, in the third section I argue that Campbell's proposal provides a model-theoretic explanation of delusions (not an empathic understanding). In the fourth section I claim (perhaps more controversially) that Sass' famous The paradoxes of Delusion is in fact an exercise in conceptual clarification, and the same can be said of Rhodes and Gipps' "negative" wittgensteinian account (Sect. 5). I conclude (Sect. 6) by stating that a complete account of mental disorders in general should include the three senses of understanding I have distinguished, though the third one (philosophical clarification) is seldom explicitly considered.
Though I am sympathetic with the negative wittgensteinian account of the sort that Rhodes and Gipps proposed, this is not what my paper is about and my main point is not to defend it with new arguments from Wittgenstein's texts. In fact, in what follows I will take for granted that each of the wittgensteinian accounts discussed here can be credited with some evidence from Wittgenstein's texts, and that each captures some of the aspects of schizophrenia and delusions. Also, I will presuppose familiarity with such Wittgensteinian evidence and texts, and will not repeat any of it, as it is already presented in the papers I will discuss. 
Three Kinds of Understanding
In this section I focus on a distinction between three senses of understanding that can be expressed in phrases such as "understanding mental disorders", namely scientific explanation, empathy, and conceptual clarification. The literature on understanding and on the product of understanding, namely explanation, is vast in philosophy and in the philosophy of science in particular, and dates back to ancient Greece. My aim here is by no means to give an exhaustive review, but rather to individuate a conceptual distinction sharp enough to be employed for the use of clarifying the current debate on wittgensteinian accounts of schizophrenia.
Understanding as Providing a Scientific Explanation
In this sense, to understand a phenomenon or a regularity is to provide an explanation in accordance with the scientific theory that includes phenomena of that kind in its domain. For example, to understand the motion of the planets of the solar system is to make an inference from Newton's laws, and to understand the event of a (very old) car radiator that breaks down on a cold day is to employ the laws of thermodynamics, together with some notions about car engines, and the properties of fluids: given the laws of thermodynamics, and the environmental conditions (temperature below 0°, water in the radiator, non-elastic material), the radiator would necessarily break. These examples are familiar from the neopositivistic proposal that scientific explanation should be inference from general laws (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948) . However, it is debatable that all the scientific disciplines and theories feature general laws such as astronomy and physics, and that all scientific explanations should take the explicit form of an inference from laws (Cummins, 2000) . Philosophers of science have suggested that at least in some cases a phenomenon or regularity is understood when we are able to model a mechanism, or ideally the mechanism that produces it, in all its parts and processes (Glennan, 1996; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Salmon, 1984) . Mechanistic explanation is typical of the so-called life sciences, such as biology, botany, zoology, medicine, and psychology. We may consider a recent article published in The American Naturalist as an example. In order to understand why "liana abundance increases with decreasing precipitation and increasing seasonality, peaking in tropical dry forests", the author proposes that "the mechanism responsible for this pattern is the extensive root and efficient vascular systems of lianas, which allow them to suffer less from water stress and thus grow substantially more than trees during the dry season. This capacity of lianas to grow while competing trees are mostly dormant confers a competitive advantage that, over time, may explain the high abundance of lianas in seasonal forests throughout the tropics" (Schnitzer, 2005, 273-274) .
How is this related to understanding mental disorders? Explanations in medicine are at least in some cases mechanistic explanations, where the disease or symptom appears as the product of the interaction of the parts of a mechanism through specific processes. For example, an approach to understanding bone cancer pain may involve the description of a mechanism: osteoclasts are stimulated by the release of tumor cytokines and growth factors that upon activation cause osteolysis in the bone, which in turn is correlated with pain behaviour (Goblirsch, Zwolak, & Clohisy, 2005) . In so far as mental disorders are considered brain, or more generally somatic diseases or their symptoms, may be understood by finding out which mechanisms produce them. This is the guiding idea of the so-called strong medical model of mental disorders (Murphy, 2015) , and of most contemporary research projects aimed at integrating neurobiology, genetics and epigenetics with psychiatry and psychopathology. For example, the former Director of the US National Institute of Mental Health, Thomas Insel, repeatedly called for a "new and deep understanding of the pathophysiology" of mental disorders, emerging from "studies addressing these illnesses as brain disorders, developmental disorders, and complex genetic disorders" (2009, 700) . In a similar vein, the title of a recent article is "Making room for oxytocine in understanding depression" (McQuaid, McInnis, Abizaid, & Anisman, 2014) .
There is, however, a crucial epistemological difference between scientifically oriented psychopathology and the rest of medicine. The difference is that the present knowledge of parts and processes involved in brain functioning is far from complete-or at least far from being at the same level of knowledge as that of blood circulation, or the reproductive system. To put it simply, not all the parts and processes have been reliably identified. This fact is acknowledged both by supporters E. Lalumera of the strong medical model of mental disorders, and by its detractors (Murphy, 2015 for review) . The present state of work-in-progress knowledge of the brain calls for the introduction in our discussion of a further distinction between two types of mechanistic understanding, familiar from the contemporary debate in the philosophy of science. Explanations may mention the actual, existing parts and processes of the mechanism that produce a certain phenomenon-for example, lianas and roots, or osteoclasts, cytokines and osteolysis in the previous examples. Or alternatively, where such parts and processes are unknown, or where a more abstract explanation is needed, the explanation may mention just the functional parts and processes, independently of their physical realization. Functional parts and processes may not be real world entities: for example, we may envisage a computer model of motor detection written in LISP, but there is no assumption that the brain itself performs LISP operations. In Carl Craver's terms, the distinction is between how-actually and how-possibly models in mechanistic explanations. A how-possibly model opens up a space of possible instantiations, loosely constrained, where a how-actually model describes just one (Craver, 2006, 360-361) . Also, how-possibly models are not committed to the nature of the processes involved; specifically, they are not committed to their causal nature. I apply this distinction in the present context as follows: while the strong medical model of psychopathology aims at howactually models for understanding mental disorders, other mechanistic explanations may just stop at the how-possibly level, in which the mechanism is abstractly described in its functional parts and operations. How-possibly models are free from the burden of finding out brain-structure correlate mechanisms for mental disorders: they just show which states and processes can be responsible for a certain (unwanted) output. I shall propose in the next section that some of the philosophical attempts at understanding schizophrenia through Wittgenstein are constructions of how-possibly models, in line with a scientific-explanatory sense of understanding, or what Dominic Murphy calls "the explanatory project" in philosophy of psychiatry (Murphy, 2015) .
Understanding as Empathy
This kind of understanding is typical of the phenomenological tradition in the philosophy of mind and psychiatry, in which "understanding" is a technical term. The origin of its meaning is in Wilhelm Dilthey's famous distinction between explanation (Erklaren) and understanding (Verstehen), later adapted by Karl Jaspers when he describes two alternative but complementary approaches to psychopathology, namely the biological approach that reduces mental disorders to bodily dysfunctions (partially overlapping with the sense of understanding as scientific explanation characterized above), and the psychological approach, aimed at describing how symptoms appear from the first-person standpoint of the patient (static understanding), and how delusional contents and consequent behaviours emerge from other psychological contents the person may have (genetic understanding). Both static and genetic understanding involve the capacity of the therapist or the philosopher to put oneself "into the other individual's psyche" (Jaspers, 1963, 301) . 4 It is important to note that the aim of empathic understanding is not to grasp an ineffable subjectivity, but rather to discover a set of objective structures of experience as accessed from a particular perspective, namely, that subject's perspective (Edmund Husserl's phenomenology stresses objectivity in this respect; see Husserl, 1989; Merleau-Ponty, 1962) . For example, an imagined house and a house perceived as existing are different from the first-person standpoint, and a phenomenological analysis of someone's consciousness would differentiate between the two cases. Recent phenomenological explanations, such as Sass and Parnas' (2003) have challenged Jasper's claim of the incomprehensibility of schizophrenic delusions by proposing a (static) way of understanding this condition. They proposed that the schizophrenic's consciousness is altered in how the subject experiences oneself, in that he is hyper-reflexive (i.e., with an exaggerated self-consciousness, in which aspects of oneself are projected onto external objects), and possesses a weakened sense of self as the source of actions and awareness.
Genetic understanding, on the other hand, bears some resemblances to what in the analytical tradition is called "folk psychological explanation", in which a given mental state of a subject is seen as the product of other beliefs, hopes, desires and other mental states and their endowed contents-for example, one's regret that one's could not meet a friend, comes from one' previous desire to meet that friend. Such an attribution in turn presupposes that the subject is rational in some minimal sense, that is, responsive to basic logical meta-laws such as coherence and noncontradiction, and to basic practical principles such as choosing the best available route to fulfil one's desires. Thus, genetic understanding has been assimilated to interpretation according to a minimal principle of charity towards the interpreted subject (Davidson, 1973) . Some authors, however, notably Sass (2004) , have pointed out one important difference between genetic understanding and traditional davidsonian interpretation: the former, but not the latter, involves (at least in its contemporary forms) emotions, bodily states, proprioceptions and other states that would not be categorized as bearing content in propositional form.
To sum up, empathic understanding-be it static or genetic-is different from the scientific understanding outlined above because it adopts a first-person standpoint rather than a third-person one. Moreover, the explanandum is different in two senses, as phenomenological understanding aims at capturing how it is for the subject to be in a certain condition, whereas scientific understanding is directed at explaining why such a condition comes about, independently of how it feels to be in it (to put it simply, compare Hempel's radiator example: the explanation, be it deduction from laws or model construction, does not capture how it is for the radiator to break down due to the cold). In the case of mental disorders, or of bodily disorders in general, another distinction may be helpful in keeping the two senses of understanding apart, namely, the distinction between illness (what the person experiences as negative about her state) and disease (broadly, scientific knowledge of the problems of structure or functioning that cause illness).
Understanding as Providing a Philosophical or Conceptual Clarification
The third kind of understanding is seldom discussed explicitly in the debates regarding philosophy of psychiatry, but I think it is worth focusing on, and distinguishing from the two previous senses, for it may feature as a further level that completes our approach to the problem of mental disorders. It can be characterized as having two main goals: firstly, to provide a conceptual map or conceptual clarification of a given phenomenon; and secondly, to separate facts and values, or is's and oughts that are involved in the phenomenon. Let me illustrate both in more detail. The idea of a conceptual map or conceptual clarification is a method used in analytic philosophy, familiar from the works of Bertrand Russell (1921), R.M. Hare (1961), and Ludwig Wittgenstein himself (1953) . In some cases, conceptual clarification produces a candidate definition of the explanandum. In contemporary philosophy of psychiatry, for example, there are many attempts at providing a definition of the concept of mental disorder; Jerome Wakefield, to cite one, proposes to analyse it into the components harmful and dysfunction (1992) . In other cases, and for other authors, the definition is not a goal. For example, in an often quoted passage from the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces the idea of perspicuous representation, which is not a definition by decomposition into traits:
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases (...) . (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 122) Wittgenstein employed a technical notion of grammar, and the literature on what "perspicuous representation" means is vast (see e.g. Hacker, 2009; Hutchinson and Read 2008) . However, what is of concern here is that the kind of understanding he points to in the above passage is a non-definitional conceptual clarification, consisting in finding the links (logical, or similarity links) between how we think about a given phenomenon, and other relevant concepts.
One relevant difference that can be brought to light by conceptual clarification is that some concepts are descriptive (they refer to facts), others are evaluative (they refer to values and/or to facts as seen through our values). Descriptive concepts are related to how things are, and evaluative concepts are related to how things ought to be, or how we would like them to be. For example, a good strawberry is an evaluative expression, whereas a red strawberry is not (Hare, 1952) ; arguably, dysfunction is a value-free notion, whereas harmful is clearly evaluative (Wakefield 1992) . As Fulford, Thornton and Graham (2006) argue at length, in the field of mental health, this role of distinguishing evaluative and descriptive concepts and then re-integrating them within a comprehensive map, is the role of philosophy (Chap. 6). In their view, that I find congenial, drawing conceptual maps and highlighting the difference between facts and values is the kind of understanding that philosophy can provide with respect to mental disorders.
Let us briefly see how philosophical understanding as so conceived is different from the other two senses of understanding illustrated above. With respect to scientific explanation, philosophical understanding is not aimed at the discovery of actual mechanisms or laws, but adopts a broad perspective, in which values can be included. To quote Fulford, Thornton and Graham again, in the case of mental disorders "philosophy adds values to the facts emphasized in the medical model" (2006, 112) . With respect to empathy, philosophical explanation is not necessarily focused on the first-person perspective, though it may be; in general, its explananda can also be phenomena for which empathy makes no sense. 
Campbell, a Wittgensteinian "How-Possibly" Model
After distinguishing scientific explanation as model construction, empathy, and philosophical clarification, in this section I address the question of which kind of understanding is meant to be provided in wittgensteinian accounts of schizophrenia, starting with John Campbell's proposal. Campbell's (2001) paper is focused on understanding how delusions are formed. In Capgras delusion, patients claim that their spouse or a close relative has been replaced by an impostor. In Cotard delusion, subjects affirm that they are dead, and their body parts are rotten. More ordinary schizophrenic delusions may involve bugs in one's head or limbs. Apart from the bizarre content of the delusions (in fact, delusions could in principle be true, as Jaspers (1997) remarked, with the obvious exception of Cotard), Campbell agrees with previous accounts stating that they involve at least two familiar aspects that call for an explanation. Firstly, deluded subjects rarely act on the content of their delusions, as they would do with ordinary beliefs. For example, a Capgras patient would not generally be scared in the presence of what he thinks is an impostor, and may well accept food and company from his spouse. Deluded subjects are sometimes described as living in two separate worlds, or as being engaged in double book-keeping (Bleuler, 1950, 378, 127-130) . Secondly, they take their delusions as obvious, or do not engage in the game of giving reasons when asked: delusions are incorrigible. Campbell's aim is to compare two alternative models of delusion formation: the empiricist model, and the rationalist model. Very sketchily, according to the empiricist model, a delusion is the output of a process which involves taking one's experience at face value, and then forming a belief with a related content-for example, a feeling of stark unfamiliarity gives rise to the delusion that the patient's spouse is an impostor (Campbell, 5 E.g. a philosophical clarification of knowledge of language, as contained in Wittgenstein (1953) , is neither a scientific explanation, nor a phenomenological account. 2001, 95). On the other hand, according to the rationalist model, a delusion is "a matter of top-down disturbance in some fundamental beliefs of the subject, which may consequently affect experiences and actions" (ibid., 89). Having criticized the empiricist option, Campbell proposes a rationalist model in which delusions have the same epistemic role as framework propositions of the sort described by Wittgenstein in On certainty (1969) . As framework propositions or "hinges", 6 delusions are incorrigible and self-evident; they are out of the epistemic game of giving and asking for reasons, and set up the conceptual frame within which a person thinks and acts; moreover, they can be of a mixed variety (about oneself, one's body, space and time, material objects, folk physics, and so on).
E. Lalumera
7 More specifically, this is the abstract description of the mechanism of delusion formation that he provides: in pathologic cases the subject undergoes some change in the framework propositions (possibly caused by brain dysfunctions); this in turn produces a top-down alteration of his perceptions, giving rise to the delusional response. As for the double-book keeping explanandum, Campbell's proposed answer for the question of why delusions are often not integrated in subjects' reasoning and actions, is that component terms in delusional framework propositions acquire different meanings from those they have in reality contexts, so that the inference from, say "my spouse loves me" and "my spouse is an impostor" to "an impostor loves me" is blocked, for the occurrences of "spouse" express different concepts (Campbell, 2001, 94) . What kind of understanding of the phenomenon of delusions is Campbell proposing here? My contention is that Campbell is actually building a model for explaining how delusions are formed. It is a very abstract model, in which no brain-structure is involved or mentioned.
8 Still, it is the description of the possible mechanism by which delusions are supposed to appear as products: an explanatory mechanism involving new "bizarre" contents generated by brain dysfunctions, which in turn alter perceptions, so that additional contents are produced, and inferences blocked. In fact, Campbell himself presents the wittgensteinian account as a version of the rationalist model of delusion formation, which is meant to be a scientific-explanatory hypothesis on delusions, such as Stone and Young's and Gerrans', and as such is open to empirical testing. Note that the explanandum for Campbell is neither the subject's own perspective-as in empathic static understanding-nor the specific content of the delusions; rather, the double book-keeping aspect and the incorrigibility aspect of delusions are the focus.Campbell himself does not seem to be perfectly aware of the kind of understanding of delusions he is aiming at. In the paper, his recurrent expression is "analysis" of delusions, with respect to both his own wittgensteinian proposal, and to alternative models. However, there is more to Campbell's proposed mechanism than that which can be discovered in an analysis, which, by definition, is not meant to be open to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. He proposes empirical claims: that delusions are beliefs originated by brain malfunction, that they cause altered perceptions, and so on, as described above.
In this respect, I think that Campbell's proposal has been misread. Thus, I agree with Thornton when he claims that: "Whilst deploying the idea of delusions as Moore propositions might give a kind of external, structural description, it is not clear that we can really make sense of entertaining delusional contents as framework propositions even if the comparison helps codify from without some of their features. The analogy does not contribute towards empathic understanding" (2004, 222) . However, Thornton overlooks the possibility that Campbell's wittgensteinian proposal can be read as having a different goal to Jaspers', and that "to codify from without" some of the features of delusions is a different kind of understanding, namely, scientific model-building. I am not claiming here that Campbell succeedsin fact, which model is more suitable to represent the formation of delusions is largely an empirical issue. To repeat, my point is simply that Wittgenstein's concepts-framework propositions and bedrock, in this case-are here employed within an explanatory project, not within an empathic one.
Sass, a Wittgensteinian Clarification
Louis A. Sass famously commented on the memoirs of Daniel Schreber, a schizophrenic patient and author of a famous memoir (Sass, 1994; Schreber, 1903) .
In his own words,
The Paradoxes of Delusion is an attempt to do justice to certain phenomenological peculiarities that, I think, are essential to understanding the nature of schizophrenia. These peculiarities appear to defy the more straightforward forms of philosophical description (e.g., expressivist versus assertoric; solipsistic versus realist), yet can be captured, or at least approached, via the more subtle strategies of Wittgenstein's anti-philosophizing. I am attempting to grasp a contradictory sort of experiential world in which, it seems, "everything can be both 'real' and 'un-real', both 'inner' and 'outer,' both 'subjective' and 'objective' (Sass, 1994, 52 )". (Sass, 2004, 77) 9 Sass' main claim is that: [Schreber' s] mode of experience is strikingly reminiscent of the philosophical doctrine of solipsism, according to which the whole of reality, including the external world and other persons, is but a representation appearing to a single, individual self, namely, the self of the philosopher who holds the doctrine... Many of the details, complexities, and contradictions of Schreber's delusional world... can be understood in the light of solipsism. (Sass, 1994, p. 8) For example, Sass describes as solipsistic attitudes the cases where Schreber speaks of everything happening in reference to himself, or of objects that miraculously appear in front of him; to describe them as solipsistic is, according to Sass, a step ahead in understanding when compared to the too austere verdict of meaninglessness. Also, the patient's oscillation between a sense of self as absolutely powerful, and a sense of self reduced to nothing can be described, according to Sass, as typical of solipsism. Commentating on Sass, Rupert Read (2001 remarked that solipsism as characterized by Wittgenstein both in his Tractatus and in the Philosophical Investigations is impossible to describe, and incoherent as a concept:
There is nothing that there is to understand solipsism. The very idea of solipsism is in the end a delusion of sense. We may think we understand it; we may think we have a clear idea of what it means to think that "only I exist." Wittgenstein's great achievement, in wonderful therapeutic detail in his later work, was to show that we do not have a clear understanding of this; or rather, to show that there is no 'it' here. (Read, 2003, 137) In response, Sass qualified his own position by reminding the reader that he actually qualified Schreber as a quasi-solipsist or a pseudo-solipsist, in that sometimes he steps out of his delusional world and confronts reality, often with a clear insight of his condition ( , 127-128, see also Read, 2003 .
The gist of Read's objection to wittgensteinian accounts such as Sass' consists, nonetheless, in a more general move that points at the limits of understanding as empathy, or empathic interpretation:
The great temptation that must be resisted-but without trapping us in allegedly limited or closed languages or minds or cultures-is to think that anything human must always be comprehensible, [that] there is always some sense to be found where there is something like the linguistic jingle of rationality, the sound of sense. (Read, 2003, 141) I think, however, that Sass's own wittgensteinian endeavour to understand schizophrenia-in spite of Sass' own explicit commitment to empathetical understanding-is not of this kind. The point can be put thus: the phenomenon of schizophrenia is redescribed by Sass in an illuminating way, with the aim of clarification, through its similar link with the concept of solipsism.
10 The first-person point of view typical of empathic understanding has no key role here. It is a case of philosophical or conceptual explanation. Appropriately (though somehow self-contradictorily), Sass writes:
I do not claim, of course, that my quasi-or pseudo-solipsistic reading of Schreber's world is fully adequate to capturing the world of schizophrenia, or even of this particular patient, Daniel Paul Schreber (Sass, 1994, 118) . Indeed, I introduce the book as a kind of essay or attempt, a "thought-experiment": "not an essentialistic set of claims but an exploratory attempt to see just how many aspects of schizophrenic-type pathology can be understood on the solipsistic reading". (Sass, 2003, 129, italics mine) That Sass's wittgensteinian account-among others-is not emphatical understanding, but (philosophical) explanation is noted in a recent article by Gerrans, who qualifies it as perspicuous redescription (Gerrans, 2013, 87) . The features of 10 I acknowledge that the empathic approach and philosophical clarification are difficult to separate in Sass's analysis. I think, however, that there is a crucial distinction: with a philosophical analysis (such as Sass's) one can illustrate why empathy is not possible (or possible only to a certain extent), and I think that this is what Sass succeeds in doing. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
15 Understanding Schizophrenia Through Wittgenstein: Empathy, Explanation… philosophical explanations are in fact present: schizophrenia is linked to the concept of solipsism, and Schreber"s and other patients' behaviour is characterized in terms of epistemic possibilities and impossibilities, that is, in value terms. In other words, solipsism does not help us in understanding the words and contents of the schizophrenic patient from his perspective (empathy), but rather gives us another diagnosis of what happens to the schizophrenic mind, different from the etiological and pathophysiological diagnosis (scientific explanation).
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Rhodes and Gipps, a Negative Wittgensteinian Illustration
Finally, I will examine Rhodes and Gipps' idea of employing the concepts of framework propositions and bedrock as describing what the schizophrenic lacks, rather than, as in Campbell's proposal, what the schizophrenic re-creates. I call this a "negative wittgensteinan account". 12 An explicit explanandum in their proposal is certainty, in two respects. On the one hand, deluded subjects are certain of what they claim, and consequently do not engage in the dialectic of giving reasons when asked. 13 On the other hand, therapists and, more generally, interlocutors recognize delusions with certainty, almost immediately, even without testing whether they are uncommon or not in our cultural group, or whether they happen to be true (as a delusion of infidelity can be, when in fact one's partner is cheating) (Rhodes and Gipps, 2008, 296-297) . In their view, Wittgenstein's notion of framework propositions and of a "bedrock"-where justification comes to an end-can be a suitable explanans in both cases. As for the therapist's certainty:
Wittgenstein's conception of the bedrock allows us to offer an explanation of our clinical certainty that does not take the form of a misguided attempt at self-justification. We know automatically that the patient's belief is delusional because it conflicts with our bedrock certainties. (Rhodes and Gipps, 2008, 298-299) In other words, the fact that we live in a certain epistemic framework grounds our knowledge that some utterances and behaviours are delusional, rather than giving us explicit reasons for the diagnosis.
The deluded subject's own certainty is also illustrated with the concept of bedrock.
14 They stress the pragmatic reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty. 15 centred on passages like "the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting" ( § 110), and propose that In delusion, some aspect of the person's Background capacities has become inoperative or damaged. This results either in a lack of constraint in acquiescing in beliefs which would normally be regarded as incredible, or in a willingness to entertain doubts about everyday certainties that would normally be regarded as unassailable. (Rhodes and Gipps, 2008, 301) Here, the idea is not that the schizophrenic delusional world is a new framework, different from ours, but that the unusual epistemic behaviour and some of the oscillations between extreme doubt and extreme certainty of the deluded subject can be explained due to a damaged relation with ordinary hinges, which provide standards for action and protection from doubt. This is why I have called this proposal a negative account.
As Rhodes and Gipps' paper is very clear and has already been commented on in various places, 16 I will keep the exposition to a minimum and address my question: what kind of understanding of schizophrenia through Wittgenstein are they providing? Again, I think it is a case of philosophical explanation. They illustrate central epistemic aspects of schizophrenia -the subject's baffling certainty as incorrigibility and ungroundedness of the delusion, and the therapist's certainty that it is a delusion-with the concept of framework and background. They give a value-laden description of the phenomenon, including what the deluded person can and cannot do, from an epistemic point of view. What they do not provide is empathic understanding: precisely because we do not share the background with the deluded subject (when experiencing a delusion), we cannot make sense of their behaviour or content from their own perspective (in fact, the negative account stresses in some sense the lack of a coherent perspective). In fact, however, with respect to scientific explanation or model-building, this proposal qualifies more as an intermediate step in that direction, than a radically alternative kind of enterprise. The hypothesis at the end of the paper is in fact that work can be done from the point of view of a howactually model:
Given that the Background is realized in the functioning and structures of the brain, then it may be that some changes have their origin in purely biochemical alternations, for example, changes that may occur owing to genetics or to stress-induced neurotransmitter changes. Alternately, it seems that some changes may have their origin in acute or prolonged trauma (ibid., 306).
In a later paper, responding to Stanghellini's objection that "when studying delusions, the focus should be on providing an adequate framework for understanding, rather than providing empirical hypotheses to be tested" (2008, (311) (312) (313) (314) , they claim that scientific explanation is envisaged as guided by a philosophical explanation, aimed at indicating which aspects should be operationalized and then empirically tested (Gipps and Rhodes, 2008, 322) .
Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that Wittgenstein's concepts can in principle shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I considered two different "positive" wittgensteinian accounts-Campbell's idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass' proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a "negative" wittgensteinian account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I showed that none of these wittgensteinian accounts succeeds in empathic-phenomenological understanding, contrary to a widespread reading, but that-on the assumption that they are exegetically correct-they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to model-building explanation, and to conceptual mapping and clarification respectively. Whether all the three senses of understanding are desirable for mental health phenomena is a suggestion that I leave open. 513  514  515  516  517  518  519  520  521  522  523  524  525  526  527  528  529  530 531  532  533  534  535  536  537  538  539  540  541  542  543  544  545  546  547  548  549  550  551  552  553  554  555  556  557  558  559  560  561  562  563  564  565  566  567  568  569  570  571  572  573  574  575  576  577  578  579  580  581  582 
